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The Improvement of Conveyancing in Montana
by Legislation-A Proposal
By GARDNER CROMWELL*
INTRODUCTION
Lewis Mallaleiu Simes, former Professor of Law at Montana State
University and former member of the Montana Bar,' has added another
title to a long list of accomplished professional works. The most recent pub-
lication is The Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation," prepared
under the auspices of the American Bar Association and the Law School of
the University of Michigan. The treatise, as it is called, offers specific
suggestions for improvement, including model acts for consideration and
adoption. The purpose of this article is to discuss some of the suggestions,
to relate them to problems which appear in Montana, and to offer for con-
sideration a model marketable title act.
THE PROBLEM
The Foreword to the treatise provides a careful statement of the prob-
lem which the work concerns:
For over half a century there has been ever increasing dissatisfac-
tion with our system of transferring land. On a mounting scale
real estate transactions have grown unnecessarily slow, unduly ex-
pensive, and needlessly uncertain. With the passage of years and
the lengthening of chains of title, the process of appraising mar-
ketability has become progressively more cumbersome. The ma-
chinery employed for these purposes has become altogether inade-
quate for the needs of our time.'
It is obvious that a relatively young state such as Montana will not
now have chains of title as long as those in Michigan or New York, and that,
therefore, now lawyers, abstracters, buyers, and sellers may find the quota-
tion an overstatement. The emphasis, however, is on "now. " It is the
passage of time, the aging process, which produces the problems noted. The
young state enjoys the favored position of being able to learn from the ex-
perience of those which have gone before. It seems short-sighted to ignore
an opportunity to avoid some hurdles which are far in the future, but cer-
*Associate Professor of Law, Montana State University. B.A. 1949, LL.B. 1960,
Montana State University; LL.M. 1955, S.J.D. 1958, University of Michigan.
'More recently, he has been Professor of Law at the University of Michigan (1932-
1959), and is now serving on the faculty of the Hastings College of Law, San Fran-
cisco.
2SIMEs & TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LE)ISLATION (1960) (here-
inafter cited as SIMF s & TAYLOR).
sId. at xi.
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tainly there. One of the purposes of this article is to urge consideration of
the workable solutions so well presented in Professor Simes's work.
In the two years given by Professor Simes to the tasks of research and
drafting model legislation, every effort was made to recognize the interests
and special problems of all concerned with conveyancing, from seller and
buyer to the general public. The conclusions reached and the solutions of-
fered accept the fact that the recording act (like the automobile and the jet
aircraft and spacecraft) is here to stay. In the words of Professor Simes,
"this treatise proposes no basic changes in the recording acts. Rather it
offers legislative improvements. .... '
The principles selected to guide such an approach were these:
1. The record should include, as nearly as possible, all the facts
required to determine the state of the title.
2. So far as practicable, the record should be self-proving.
3. The length of the record required for a marketable title should
be shortened.
4. Stale claims should be eliminated.
5. Some future interests should be restricted in duration.
The result of the attack upon the problem along the lines indicated is
a volume which "is an attempt to propose legislative remedies which will
either reduce risks now assumed by parties interested in title transactions
or lighten the task of the title examiner, or both." The selection of sub-
ject-matter for the discussion which follows was made upon the basis of
two considerations: 1) the obvious one of space available for publication;
2) judgment of the relevance of particular subject-matter to Montana. In
some cases, section titles are identical to those employed by Professor Simes.
A MARKETABLE TITLE ACT
At least one title examination standard employed in this state estab-
lishes marketabilit - of title as the basis of the examination and defines a
marketable title as "one free from grave defects and doubts and litigious
uncertainty, and consists of both legal and equitable title fairly deducible
of record.' T~he standard states a principle which has resulted in the
adoption by nine states' of so-called marketable title acts. The purpose of
such acts is to cut off adverse interests which originated earlier than some
time in the past (say 40 years) unless the holders of suelh interests recOrd
notices of them. While the result of such a provision is not to end all
search back of the period stated, it does appreciably lessen the task of the
title examiner, and decrease the number of possible clouds on the title. In
order to facilitate examination and discussion of the proposal, there is here
'Id. at xvi.
'Id. at xxi.
6Standard 60, Montana Bar Association Title Examination Standards.
'Professor Simes lists Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and the province of Ontario. See SImEs &
TAYLOR 295-349.
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set out (section by section, with comment following each) the text of the
"Model Marketable Title Act."8
Section 1. Marketable Record Title. Any person having the
legal capacity to own land in this state, who has an unbroken chain
of title of record to any interest in land for forty years or more,
shall be deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest
as defined in Section 8, subject only to the matters stated in Section
2 hereof. A person shall be deemed to have such an unbroken chain
of title when the official public records disclose a conveyance or
other title transaction, of record not less than forty years at the
time the marketability is to be determined, which said conveyance
or other title transaction purports to create such interest, either in
(a) the person claiming such interest, or
(b) some other person from whom, by one or more convey-
ances or other title transactions of record, such purported
interest has become vested in the person claiming such in-
terest;
with nothing of record, in either case, purporting to divest such
claimant of such purported interest.
The phrase "marketable title," as it is used in Section 1 and as it is
defined in Section 8 (infra) does not act as a substantive rule that the
vendee in a land contract which calls for "marketable title" is obliged to
accept a title which fits the definition in this act." It means that, if the
exceptions which are stated in Section 2 do not exist, all interests which are
prior to the forty-year title are extinguished. If the practical effect of such
extinguishment is to end all other claims, then the title may be "market-
able" in the contract sense.
It is obvious, of course, that, in order to reach the root of title, it may
be necessary to search farther back than forty years. It would be rare to
find a transaction exactly forty years earlier than the date upon which the
search begins. However, once the date of the root of title is found, claims
not filed as required by Section 4 (infra) within forty years after that date
are extinguished. Hence, a'search begun in 1960 may find the root of
title in a transaction not in 1920, exactly forty years ago, but in an instru-
ment recorded in 1914. Forty years later, in the year 1954, claims not
properly protected by recording are lost.
8The Model Act is printed on pages 6-10 of the treatise, which will not be citedhereafter when sections of the Act are quoted. The Model Act is based upon the
Marketable Title Act of Michigan, MicHi. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1271-.1279 (so cited in
the treatise), which the authors believe to be the best of its kind. The comments
on the Act In this article draw extensively upon the discussion in the treatise.
'A number of Montana cases have considered the question of what is merchantable
title for the purposes of a contract to convey, but all of them rely on Ogg v.
Herman, 71 Mont. 10, 227 Pac. 476 (1924). There the court decided that the terms
"clear title," "good title," and "merchantable title" are synonymous, and that
"merchantable" and "marketable" are interchangeable. It defined a good title as
one free from litigation, palpable defects and grave doubts, and one fairly deduci-
ble from the public records. See Conner v. Helvik, 105 Mont. 437, 73 P.2d 541
(1937) ; Silfvast v. Asplund, 93 Mont. 584, 20 P.2d 631 (1933) ; Williams v. Hefner,
89 Mont. 361, 297 Pac. 492 (1931) ; Gantt v. Harper, 82 Mont. 393, 267 Pac. 296
(1928).
[Vol. 22,
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The Model Act protects "any interest," as does the Michigan statute,'
in contrast to, for example, the Minnesota statute, which refers to "a claim
of title based upon a source of title, which source has been of record at
least forty years."" This language was held, in Wichelman v. Messner,"
to protect only a recorded fee simple ownership. The editors point out'
that in most cases, the value of the Act is to clear title to fees simple, so
limiting the operation to such estates would not do harm.
Although the marketable title acts in Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota,
and South Dakota ' require that the person claiming the protection of the
statute be in possession, the Model Act does not so provide. The reason for
this choice is the principle stated earlier that the record ought to be self-
proving.' Requiring notice of the physical fact of possession bases de-
termination of the quality of "marketability" upon matters which can not
be recorded. However, the result is that there can exist two marketable
record titles to the same land at the same time- that is, there may exist
two chains which meet the standards of the statute. The practical answer,
states the treatise, is that "the case will rarely arise where there are two
independent chains of title, each being 'marketable' under the terms of
marketable title legislation, and it is believed that alternative is preferable
to a universal requirement of possession."
Finally, in consideration of the first section of the Act, it is pertinent
to examine the length of the period. The Model Act specifies forty years;
the periods of the other acts run from 19 to 75 years. The evidence which
the authors had before them' indicated that under a long-term statute, there
are few notices of adverse claims filed. The Act then demonstrates one of
its practical effects - making certain that stale claims will not be asserted.
A relatively short period, however, may have the effect of cutting off live
and timely claims (easements or mortgages, for example) simply because
the holders failed to record a notice. The purposes of the act, to lessen
the burdens assumed by the vendee and to ease the task of the title examiner,
are well served by selection of a period sufficiently long that it will not ac-
cidentally cut off valid claims while putting an end to old conflicts.
Section 2. Matters to _Which Marketable Title is Subject. Such
marketable title shall be subject to:
(a) All interests and defects which are inherent in the muni-
ments of which such chain of record title is formed; provided, how-
ever, that a general reference in such muniments, or any of them,
to easements, use restrictions or other interests created pior to the
rout of 'itie shall not be sufficient to preserve them, unless specific
identification be made therein of a recorded title transaction which
creates such easement, use restriction or other interest.
'MIOH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1271.
nMINN. STAT. § 541.023 (1957).
'250 Minn. 88,83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
'SIMS & TAYLO 351-52.
"IOWA CODE § 614.17 (1958); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-288 (Supp. 1949); N.D. RUv.
CODE § 47-19A01 (Supp. 1957) ; S.D. CODE § 51-16B01 (Supp. 1952).
'BSee the text following note 5, supra.SIMES & TAYo 355.
1960]
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(b) All interests preserved by the filing of proper notice
or by possession by the same owner continuously for a period of
forty years or more, in accordance with Section 4 hereof.
(c) The rights of any person arising from a period of ad-
verse possession or user, which was in whole or in part subsequent
to the effective date of the root of title.
(d) Any interest arising out of a title transaction which has
been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title
from which the unbroken chain of title of record is started; pro-
vided, however, that such recording shall not revive or give validity
to any interest which has been extinguished prior to the time of the
recording by the operation of Section 3 hereof.
(e) The exceptions stated in Section 6 hereof as to rights of
reversioners in leases, as to apparent easements and interests in the
nature of easements, and as to interests of the United States.
It might be said that any marketable title act is as strong as its weak-
est link, and that the weakest link is the portion of the statute which ex-
cepts any interests from the operation of the statute. If the chief purpose
of the act is to shorten title examinations, the purpose is defeated if excep-
tions to the operation of the statute require the examiner to go, for any
reason, back of the time limited. Suppose, for example, that subsection
(a) did not include the proviso concerning general references. The result
would be that the title examiner who found a general reference to ease-
ments of record in the instrument which was to be the root of title would
be required to search "back to the beginning" for any such interests. So,
the effect of subsection (a) is to require either specific references (and this
requirement is quite obviously prospective in nature) to encumbrances or
(as will appear fromn the next subsection) filing of a claim within the
forty-year period. If, however, the instrument which constitutes the root
of title also creates, for example, an easement in the grantor, that easement
will not be cut off no matter how long the period because it is inherent in
the muniment which is in the chain of title.
The exceptions noted in subsection (b) anticipate the provisions of
Section 4 of the Act, which is discussed hereinafter. Subsection (c) pro-
tects the rights of an adverse possessor which begin either before or after
the date of the root of title, but which come to fruition thereafter. The
Act, then, does not affect the doctrine of adverse possession; it does not
act as a statute of limitation. Although the object of the Model Act is to
restrict the determination of relevant facts to the public record, the facts
which constitute adverse possession can never be found there. In one situa-
tion, a title gained by adverse possession is cut off just as would be any
other title. If such title has been perfected prior to the date of the insttu-
ment which constitutes the root of title, it is extinguished forty years after
that date. If the holder of the adverse title fails to file notice of his claim
as required by Section 4 (infra), his interest ends.
The effect of subsection (d), put quite simply, is to give precedence to
the later of two roots of title (two separate chains), if it has not already
[Vol. 22,
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been extinguished. Consider the examples put in the treatise :" A grants
to B in fee simple by deed recorded in 1912. However, in 1915, Y records
a deed to the same land in fee simple to him from X (a separate chain).
In 1925, B grants to C in fee simple, the deed being recorded that year.
Under the terms of subsection (d), Y, at the end of his forty-year period
in 1955, takes subject to C's interest, the result being the same as if C had
filed a notice in 1925. If, however, the transaction between B and C took
place in 1957, the proviso would function: The completion of the forty-year
period for Y in 1955 extinguishes B's interest, and the transaction with C
does not revive it."
Section 3. Interests Extinguished by Marketable Title. Sub-
ject to the matters stated in Section 2 hereof, such marketable
record title shall be held by its owner and shall be taken by any
person dealing with the land free and clear of all interests, claims
or charges whatsoever, the existence of which depends upon any
act, transaction, event or omission that occurred prior to the ef-
fective date of the root of title. All such interests, claims or
charges, however denominated, whether legal or equitable, present
or future, whether such interests, claims or charges are asserted by
a person sui juris or under a disability, whether such person is
within or without the state, whether such person is natural or
corporate, or is private or governmental, are hereby declared to be
null and void.
This section underlines the proposition stated in the proviso in sub-
section (d) of Section 2 - such interests are extinguished and are not re-
vived in any way. Without such straightforward language, of course, the
effectiveness of the Act would be lost. In addition, the provision relieves
the purchaser of any risk of loss which he might carry as the result of the
practice existing in some jurisdictions" of examiners limiting their search
to some arbitrary period. When the Act makes the interests null and void,
there is no risk that the vendee will some day be obliged to engage in a
quiet title action over matters more than forty years old. It was noted in
the discussion of Section 1 that the experience of states was that few claims
are filed if the period is relatively long. This experience underlines an ob-
servation which is relevant to the final cutting-off provided for by Section
3. Practically speaking, probably nothing is really cut off. The effective-
ness of the Section lies in its "cleaning up" of titles, and in ending concern
over theoretically possible claims which will actually never be raised.
Section 4. Effect of Filing Notice or the Equivalent.
(a) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve
and keep effective such interest by filing for record during the
forty-year period immediately following the effective date of the
root of title of the person whose record title would otherwise be
marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath, setting forth
the nature of the claim. No disability or lack of knowledge of any
kind on the part of anyone shall suspend the running of said forty-
"Id. at 14, 15.
'
8See id. at 355-57 for additional discussion of the exception question.
"See 4 AMERICAN L&W OF PROPERTY §- 18.16 (Casner ed. 1952), especially note 2.
1960]
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year period. Such notice may be filed for record by the claimant
or by any other person acting on behalf of any claimant who is
(1) under a disability,
(2) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or
(3) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be estab-
lished or is uncertain at the time of filing such notice
of claim for record.
(b) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in
land has been in possession of such land continuously for a period
of forty years or more, during which period no title transaction
with respect to such interest appears of record in his chain of title,
and no notice has been filed by him or on his behalf as provided in
Subsection (a), and such possession continues to the time when
marketability is being determined, such period of possession shall
be deemed equivalent to -the filing of the notice immediately preced-
ing the termination of the forty-year period described in Subsec-
tion (a).
Perhaps the meat of this section is contained in the second sentence of
subsection (a): "No disability or lack of knowledge of any kind on the
part of anyone shall suspend the running of said forty-year period." Com-
monly, the running of any statute of limitation is suspended for the period
of specified disabilities, and this is virtually always the case with limitations
of actions concerning land.' However, the Model Act, pursuing the stated
objects of shortening title searches and eliminating stale claims, provides
no exception for disabilities. Subsection (a) avoids hardship by allowing
any person to file for a claimant who is under a disability. To the conten-
tion that such a provision adds to the burdens of one not sui juris, one may
answer that, as with the requirement that one seeking to preserve an inter-
est file a claim, it is but a little burden. Professor Simes likens it to the
burden of recording which recording acts placed upon the grantee in a
deed.' Originally, the first grantee took because he was prior in time. The
recording acts changed this by requiring him to take his deed to the recorder,
else a subsequent grantee get there first.' In any event, we revert to the
experience of other states with marketable title acts that few claims are
ever filed.'
As was noted, subsection (b) of Section 4 is related to subsection (b)
of Section 2. In practice, as the treatise points out, the situation which
this provision concerns is not likely to arise. "But if such a situation should
arise, it would seem to be unfair to deprive B [the possessor] of his title
as against Y (who may have been a grantee under a wild deed) merely
because B failed to file a notice of claim.' "' Only in this connection is the
fact of possession significant in the operation of the Model Act, and it must
'See, e.g., REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-2515. (Hereinafter REVISED CODES
OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.)
'SIMES & TAYLOR 4.
This is especially true in a notice-race jurisdiction such as Montana. See R.C.M.
1947, § 73-202.
"See note 16, 8upra.
"SIMES & TAYLOB 14.
[Vol. 22,
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be connected with a recorded instrument which goes back at least forty
years.
Section 5. Contents of Notice; Recording and Indexing. To
be effective and to be entitled to record the notice above referred to
shall contain an accurate and full description of all land affected
by such notice which description shall be set forth in particular
terms and not by general inclusions; but if said claim is founded
upon a recorded instrument, then the description in such notice
may be the same as that contained in such recorded instrument.
Such notice shall be filed for record [with the county clerk] of the
county or counties where the land described therein is situated.
The [county clerk] of each county shall accept all such notices
presented to him which describe land located in the county in which
he serves and shall enter and record full copies thereof in the same
way that deeds and other instruments are recorded and each
[county clerk] shall be entitled to charge the same fees for the
recording thereof as are charged for recording deeds. In indexing
such notices in his office each [county clerk] shall enter such no-
tices under the grantee indexes of deeds under the names of the
claimants appearing in such notices. Such notices shall also be
indexed under the description of the real estate involved in a book
set apart for that purpose to be known as the "Notice Index.'
The concluding sentence of Section 5 is intended to be used in juris-
dictions where there is no tract index, in order to assist the searcher in
locating such notices. This kind of provision is in the Iowa statute.' An
additional device for simplifying the search is contained in the Indiana act
which requires the person filing a notice of claim to recite the name of the
present owner of the land. The notice is then indexed under that name.'
Section 6. Interests Not Barred by Act. This Act shall not
be applied to bar any lessor or his successor as a reversioner of his
right to possession on the expiration of any lease; or to bar or ex-
tinguish any easement or interest in the nature of an easement, the
existence of which is clearly observable by physical evidence of its
use; or to bar any right, title or interest of the United States, by
reason of failure to file the notice herein required.
This section joins with Section 2 to constitute the only exception to
operation of the Act. The reason for exclusion of the lessor is that, since
he is not in possession, he may not learn of adverse interests in time to
protect himself by filing. The lessee, of course, does not run the ".me risk.
Although their discovery necessitates looking outside the record, easements
or similar interests visible on the ground are excepted. And interests of the
United States would probably not be cut off whether or not they were
'Th6 bracketed phrases are changes from the Model Act, introduced to employ lan-
gauge already used elsewhere in the Montana statutes. The words "with the
county clerk" were substituted for the phrase "in the registry of deeds" used in
the Act. (See, e.g., R.C.M. 1947, § 73-201.) The words "county clerk" were sub-
stituted for the word "recorder" which is used in the Model Act. (R.C.M. 1947,
§ 16-2905 refers to the "county clerk as ex officio recorder.")
'IoWA CODE § 614.18 (1958).
V7IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-630 (Supp. 1960).
1960]
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specifically mentioned." Future interests such as the possibility of reverter
or remainder are not excepted from operation of the Act unless they fall
within the provisions of subsection (a) of Section 2.' The drafters of the
Model Act note that, if a relatively long period (40 years) is chosen as the
basis for determining marketability, many future interests will not be af-
fected. In addition, the growth in the attitude that lengthy lives of such
future interests may not be good policy is an influence.' As with any other
outstanding interest, of course, the holder of a future interest may protect
it by filing a claim as provided in Section 4. There remains but one type
of interest which is not excepted - that of the state or municipality. The
drafters of the Model Act have not excepted such interests because they
believe the practice undesirable, and they point out that the state or city
can file a claim.' This attitude should receive welcome in Montana, in view
of the policy which subjects the state to the operation of statutes of limita-
tion concerning land.'
Section 7. Limitations of Actions and Recording Acts.
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to extend the
period for the bringing of an action or for the doing of any other
required act under any statutes of limitations, nor, except as here-
in specifically provided, to affect the operation of any statutes
governing the effect of the recording or the failure to record any
instrument affecting land.
This provision emphasizes that a marketable title act is not a substitute
for a statute of limitations for actions concerning land or for usual record-
ing practices. Many rights may be cut off by the operation of a statute
of limitations' long before the end of the forty-year period recommended
for the Act. Likewise, the purpose of the Act is not to alter the substantive
results provided for in present recording statutes. The grantee, in order
to be protected, must still win the race to the courthouse." If he does not,
his recording under this Act will not revive any claim he may have had.
If he asserts a claim, he must record it within the forty-year period.'
Section 8. Definitions. As used in this Act:
(a) "Marketable record title" means a title of record, as
indicated in Section 1 hereof, which operates to extinguish such in-
terests and claims, existing prior to the effective date of the root of
title, as are stated in Section 3 hereof.
(b) "Records" includes probate and other official public
records, as well as records in the registry of deeds.
'SIMES & TAYLoB 15, 357.
"0See the text following note 16, 8upra.
'There is no such policy apparent in Montana. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 67-406 and -407
concern suspension of the power of alienation. Traditionally, future interests, be-
cause vested, have not been subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
m SIMES & TAYLoR 357.
t R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2501. In a decision applying the predecessor of this Code section,
the Montana Supreme Court held that statutes of limitation are applicable to the
state. Newton v. Weiler, 87 Mont. 164, 286 Pac. 133 (1930).
'See, e.g., R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2504.MR.C.M. 1947, § 73-202.
'See sections 2 and 4, respectively, of the Act.
[Vol. 22,
9
Cromwell: Improvement of Conveyancing
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1960
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING
(c) "Recording," when applied to the official public records
of a probate or other court, includes filing.
(d) "Persons dealing with land" includes a purchaser of
any estate or interest therein, a mortgagee, a levying or attaching
creditor, a land contract vendee, or any other person seeking to
acquire an estate or interest therein, or impose a lien thereon.
(e) "Root of title" means that conveyance or other title
transaction in the chain of title of a person, purporting to create
the interest claimed by such person, upon which he relies as a basis
for the marketability of his title, and which was the most recent to
be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when market-
ability is being determined. The effective date of the 'root of title'
is the date on which it is recorded.
(f) "Title transaction" means any transaction affecting
title to any interest in land, including title by will or descent, title
by tax deed, or by trustee's, referee's, guardian's, executor's, ad-
ministrator's, master in chancery's, or sheriff's deed, or decree of
any court, as well as warranty deed, quitclaim deed, or mortgage.
It is only at this point that I would disagree with the drafters about
the organization of the Act. The treatise does not reveal any reason for
placing the definitions of terms used in the Act at the end of it, nor is any
immediately apparent. It would seem far more helpful, especially when
the matter presents a new approach - really a new legal theory - to de-
fine terms at the beginning. This would save, among other things, the
effort required to leaf backward to definitions while proceeding through
new material. While precedent need not always govern, it is true that plac-
ing definitions first is the method usually followed in model and uniform
acts.'"
The phrase "registry of deeds" which appears in subsection (b) of
Section 8 has not been changed, although the same phrase was deleted from
Section 5. The reason for the difference.in treatment is that the phrase
seems to have been used by the drafters in two different ways. To say file
for record "with the county clerk," in order to relate the language of the
Model Act to the Montana recording statutes, is different from using the
phrase "registry of deeds" to denote a place where records will be found.
The last sentence of subsection (e) of Section 8 provides that the date
of the root of title is the date upon which the instrument which constitutes
the root is recorded. This would not ordinarily appear to be a source of
difficulty. However, a Montana statute" provides that an instrument is
deemed to be recorded when it is deposited in the county clerk's office. In
addition, the notice provision states that an instrument is notice to sub-
sequent purchasers and encumbrancers "from the time it is filed with the
county clerk for record." The California Supreme Court has held that the
statute which is the parent of the first one referred to must be construed
'See, e.g., the UNIFORM ADOPTION AcT, 9 U.L.A. 29; the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION
AcT, 9 U.LA. 115; the UNlF'OitM CivIL LIABILrrY FOR SUPPORT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 219; the
UNIFoRM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT, 9 U.L.A. 233.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 73-111.
8sR.C.M. 1947, § 73-201.
19601
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with another and that the result is that an instrument is not notice until
it has been transcribed into the proper record book.' On the other hand,
the Supreme Court of Montana, in Guerin v. Sunburst Oil and Gas Co.,'
held that the option involved in that case gave constructive notice of its
contents from the time it was filed with the county clerk. It is to be noted,
however, that the option was filed and transcribed on the same day, and
that the case concerned not the time of recording but the place of transcrib-
ing.
For certainty, and to avoid irrelevant hairsplitting arguments about
time, adoption of the Model Act language is recommended. Since this is
specific legislation, it would appear not to be subject to the conclusive pre-
sumption noted heretofore. The words "the date on which it is recorded,"
then, would be construed as meaning the date when the instrument was
transcribed upon the proper record. It is only when one can see the copy
of the instrument that he has notice. Furthermore, when establishing a
matter so conclusive as a root of title, it seems wise to provide a method
which is sure.
The recommendation contained in the preceding paragraph is in ac-
cordance with the intent expressed in the next section of the Act.
Section 9. Act to Be Liberally Construed. This Act shall be
liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of simplifying
and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely
on a record chain of title as described in Section 1 of this Act, sub-
ject only to such limitations as appear in Section 2 of this Act.
The concluding section of the Model Act contains its constitutional
basis, a subject which will be considered in the next portion of this article.
Section 10.. Two-Year Extension of Forty-Year Period. If the
forty-year period specified in this Act shall have expired prior to
two years after the effective date of this Act, such period shall be
extended two years after the effective date of this Act.
The effect of this provision is that if the Model Act is effective on July
1, 1961, any forty-year period which began after July 1, 1921, and before
July 1, 1923, will run something longer than forty years, or until July 1,
1963. The purpose of this extension is to provide an opportunity for filing
for those who have claims. Providing such an opportunity avoids constitu-
tional objections concerning arbitrary cutting off of interests.'
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Appendix A of the treatise is an extensive article discussing generally
the constitutionality of model legislation and drawing specific conclusions
about the acts offered. After discussion of the problems involved in federal
constitutional law, the authors conclude :'
"Cady v. Purser, 131 Cal. 552, 63 Pac. 844 (1901). The parent statute is now CAL.
CiV. CODE § 1170.
'168 Mont. 365, 218 Pac. 949 (1923).
"SIMuS & TAYLOR 271-72,
"'Id. 255.
[Vol. 22,
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Since the Supreme Court of the United States has sustained the
constitutionality of rent legislation, mortgage moratorium statutes,
zoning laws, and many other kinds of regulatory statutes having a
dramatic impact upon property, we may confidently expect that it
will also sustain any reasonable legislation having as its objective
the marketability of land titles and that all enlightened state courts
will do likewise.
Then, although recognizing the difficulty of stating general principles,
they consider some recognized doctrines, citing cases in support thereof."
1. The constitutional prohibitions are not absolute. In each
case, the public interest to be advanced by a statute is balanced
against the extent and importance of the deprivation of property
or the impairment of contract rights.
2. A statute which modifies, restricts or abolishes property
interests to be created in the future, and which, therefore, is not re-
troactive, is rarely unconstitutional on this ground.
3. If an existing property interest is unsubstantial, retroac-
tive legislation to restrict or extinguish it is not necessarily in viola-
tion of due process provisions.
4. Courts go farther in sustaining the constitutionality of
statutes which modify the use of existing property interests than
statutes which restrict or extinguish existing ownership.
5. A change in the rules of evidence is not unconstitutional
on the ground that it operates retroactively.
6. Curative acts, which necessarily operate retroactively, are
not unconstitutional for that reason.
7. Statutes of limitations which operate retroactively are not
unconstitutional for that reason.
8. Legislation in the nature of a recording act is constitutional
even though it requires the recording or re-recording of instru-
ments executed before the effective date of the act.
The authors of the treatise take the position that the retrospective action
of the Model Act is justified under principles 1 and 8." In addition, as
they point out, the two jurisdictions which have been called upon to pass
upon the constitutionality of marketable title acts have upheld them. Both
Minnesota' and Iowa," the latter in two decisions, have held their respective
acts constitutional. And the Supreme Court of Minnesota employed lan-
guage much like that sliggested in priniple 1; noted heretofore-
What can be said about the future of any such legislation in Montana?
The Montana constitutional provisions which might be involved in any de-
termination are as follows:
Article III, section 11. No ex post facto law nor law impairing
the obligation of contracts, or making any irrevocable grant of spe-
'Id. 255-70.
"Id. 271.
"Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
"'Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 NW. 553 (1941) ; Tesdell v. Hanes,
248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957),
1960]
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cial privileges, franchises, or immunities, shall be passed by the
legislative assembly.
Article XV, section 13. The legislative assembly shall pass no
law for the benefit of a railroad or other corporation, or any in-
dividual or association of individuals, retrospective in its operation,
or which imposes on the people of any county or municipal subdi-
vision of the state, a new liability in respect to transactions or con-
siderations already passed.
In addition, this statute has some bearing on the problem: "No law
contained in any of the codes or other statutes of Montana is retroactive
unless expressly so declared. "'
It is submitted that none of these provisions prevents adoption of the
Model Act. The retrospective operation of the Act is this: An action
(recording of an instrument) performed forty or more years in the past
is, by the Act, given a significance which it did not have when it was per-
formed. It becomes, instead of being just one of any number of instruments
in a chain, a special kind of instrument, called a "root of title." And, be-
cause it happened to have been accomplished at a particular point in time,
it has the effect of cutting off all interests antagonistic to it which were
created prior to that point in time. This will be true, however, only of
instruments recorded before the date of passage of the Act. Any transac-
tion consummated after the date of the Act will be subject to the provisions
of the Act as it would be subject to all pertinent law; therefore, as to it,
the Act does not operate restrospectively. The only question is, then,
whether the effect of the Act upon transactions which were completed prior
to its passage is to impair the obligation of the contract or to benefit retro-
spectively a corporation or an individual or an association of individuals.'
As was already noted, the last section of the Model Act provides a
two-year extension of the basic forty-year period in certain circumstances.
The effect of the provision is to give notice to all who may have interests
to protect that they have two years after the date of passage to re-record
them. There is no Montana holding on the constitutionality of the statute
requiring recording of instruments,"9 but decisions from other jurisdictions
would seem to lay the matter at rest. Early in the nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Jackson ex dem. Hart v.
Lanphire.' Passing on an early recording statute, the Court held that a
state legislature had the power to make an older deed void in the face of a
junior deed if the older were not recorded within a reasonable time after
passage of the act. Such an act, said the Court, did not impair the obliga-
tion of contract.
Somewhat later, the Supreme Court of California came to a similar
'R.C.M. 1947, § 12-201.
'The Montana Supreme Court stated in Bullard v. Smith, 28 Mont. 387, 72 Pac. 761(1903), and since, in Durocher v. Myers, 84 Mont. 225, 274 Pac. 1062 (192S), that,
except for the provision in article III, section 11 of the Montana Constitution, the
legislature can pass any retrospective law which does not violate the obligations
of contracts.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 73-201.
w28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830).
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conclusion. The parent of Montana's recording statute is section 1214 of
the California Civil Code. Its predecessor was an act passed in 1850, which
required that conveyances made prior to that date (as well as those made
thereafter) be recorded. In an 1857 case, Stafford v. Lick,1 it 'was held
that an act which requires recording of conveyances made prior to the date
of the act does not divest vested rights.
A much more recent decision states a similar conclusion. The Colorado
constitution contains a provision much like those quoted above from Mon-
tana: "No .. . law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective
in its operation . .. shall be passed. . . ."' In a 1932 case,' the matter for
decision was the effect of an unrecorded deed which the grantee received
eight years before a recording act was passed. The grantee contended that
it was not obliged to record since the deed was effective before the act was
passed. Any other result, it argued, would impair its contract and cause
the statute to operate retrospectively in contravention of the constitution.
Not so, said the court. The act did not impair the grantee's contract because
that had already been performed. It was not retrospective in operation be-
cause the grantee had had time after the statute was passed to record and
protect itself. It had not chosen to do so; whatever it lost, it had thrown
away.
These decisions have concerned only the effect of statutes which re-
quired recording originally; the Model Act would require re-recording. A
recent decision very much in point is Opinion of the Justices.6"  The New
Hampshire Senate proposed a measure, known as Senate Bill 80, which
provided that mortgages on record more than forty years were void unless
re-recorded within that period. The Senate sought an advisory opinion of
the supreme court, the question being whether the bill violated the pro-
hibition of Article 23 of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights against retro-
spective laws. The opinion stated that, while the particular bill was un-
constitutional, one which gave a mortgagee a reasonable time to re-record
after the effective date of the act would be constitutional. This is just the
provision which the Model Act contains. It would appear, therefore, that,
with regard for Montana, the opinion of the drafters of the Model Act that
it is constitutional is a good one.
It is appropriate, before leaving this subject, to consider briefly two
decisions which have some relevance. Neither concerned a marketable title
act, and tue Ar 0 4- r - 1-c Modell, Ac stat that+lo "each is iruaidv iin-fUU LJ bt LII
____~ 
IiI.guishable. ' Each case considered an act which required the bringing of
a suit rather than re-recording, and the cutting off of interests resulted
from failure to bring suit. In a Kansas case' the act was designed to pre-
vent having to trace title back of a recorded plat, and required bringing
a suit to protect an adverse claim. The Kansas Supreme Court relied upon
"7 Cal. 479 (1857).
"CoLo. CONST. art II, § 11.
'4Moore v. Chalmers-Galloway Live Stock Co., 90 Colo. 548, 10 P.2d 950 (1932).5'101 N.H. 51'5, 131 A.2d 49 (1957).
'SIMs & TAYLOR 273.
'Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, 203 P.2d 160, 7 A.L.R.2d 1360 (1949).
1.960]
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a statement by Justice Cooley 7 that a limitation law can not require one
who is already enjoying all he claims to resort to legal proceedings. In a
decision concerning a similar situation, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held unconstitutional a statute which extinguished certain mortgages and
other claims if suit were not brought within one year after the date of the
act.' Neither of these cases involved provisions which required re-record-
ing; both required bringing an action. The differences between such a re-
quirement and that of the Model Act are clear.
CONCLUSION
It need hardly be said that a discussion of such brief compass is no sub-
stitute for careful study of the treatise. The purpose of this article has
been to submit for consideration a workable and scholarly solution for some
conveyancing problems. It has not treated all possible bases for discussion
of the Model Act; it does not pretend to an exhaustive treatment of relevant
cases, either in Montana or in other states. If it serves to excite interest or
discussion, if it leads to the asking of questions which are not treated within
it or, what is far more remote, in the treatise, then it has served its pur-
pose.' And, while this is not proposed upon such brief examination, should
the Model Act receive careful consideration for submission to the legisla-
ture, the endeavors of the drafters will have been to the best purpose. In
that event, it will be proper to note that the treatise does not propose a code
of model acts, all of which ought to be adopted. The point is made clear in
the introduction to the work in this sentence: "Each act is complete in and
of itself and can be separately enacted.'' ®
This observation is pertinent, however. The treatise also offers a
Model Real Property Limitations Act, and notes that Montana's legislation
on limitations of action is subject to criticism.' Briefly put, the problem
is that, although Chapter 25 of Title 93' concerns "Limitations of Actions
for Recovery of Real Property," Chapter 27, "Time of Commencement of
Actions- General Provisions Concerning," is apparently also applicable.
These provisions were apparently intended to be only procedural, but, if
the provisions of Chapter 27 are applied to actions relating to real property,
the results are very uncertain. In fact, the drafters comment that if the
latter provisions are applicable, they "inject such an element of uncer-
tainity into the length of the period as to make the statute of very little
value for title purposes.'" Accordingly, it is recommended that any ef-
fort to enact marketable title legislation in Montana include a proposal to
clear up the ambiguity suggested. This could be accomplished by a bill
repealing the present Chapter 25 of Title 93, substituting therefor the
57The court cited COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL IMrrATIONS 365 (1st ed. 1868). The state-
ment also appears in 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 762 (8th ed. 1927),
citing cases later than 1868.
'Girard Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 364 Pa. 576, 73 A.2d 371 (1950).
'If it leads to a run on the bookselling facilities of the University of Michigan Law
School, I do not expect any commission beyond the pleasure that this remarkable
treatise has received the attention it deserves.
'S s & TAYLOR xxiii.
"Id. 39.
"R.C.M., 1947.
"See note 61, supra.
[Vol. 22,
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Model Real Property Limitations Act," and limiting the application of the
present Chapter 27 to actions other than those concerning real property.'
Finally, it may be noted that the advent of a marketable title act has
had little adverse affect on either attorney-abstract jurisdictions or those in
which title insurance is widely used. One commentator from Minnesota,'
a title insurance executive, stated that the effect of the marketable title act
in his state was to eliminate "fly-specking," and that the title insurance
business continued to grow. With regard to attorney-abstract states, the
only comment necessary is a quotation from the authors of the treatise:
"The nine states in which marketable title acts have been enacted are Mid-
western states in which the attorney-abstract system is dominant and in
some of which the length of chains of title back to the governmental source
results in lengthy and complicated abstracts.' '
simEs & TAYoR 44.
6No such endeavor should be undertaken without the benefit of the discussion be-ginning at page 37 of the treatise. Much of the material on constitutionality is
relevant, especially that at page 274.
OLeo A. Reuder in 31 Title News (No. 11) 117 (1952). In his remarks, Mr. Reuderquotes a letter from an Indiana title insurance company executive whose experi-
ence was the same. It is interesting, however, that the Indianan thought that few
lawyers relied on the act because it had not been tested in the courts.
"SIxEs & TAoR 800.
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